We develop a multi-period general equilibrium model of bank deposit, credit, and interim interbank loan markets in which banks initially specialize in their choices of debtors, leading to underdiversi cation, but nevertheless become entwined via inter-bank markets, leading to the fortunes of one bank affecting the pro ts and default rates of the other in a sequential manner. Lack of (full) diversi cation among credit risks arises in our model owing to a relative pro t argument in each banker's utility function, which is otherwise risk-and default-averse. We examine its implications for the welfare of depositors and debtors.
Introduction
The topic of Systemic Risk, and its attendant phenomena described variously as Financial Fragility, Contagion (of panics, possibly) etc have received much scrutiny in the applied cum empirical, and increasingly in the theoretical banking literature. The key underlying notion involved, that dif culties or failure of one institution may spread to others causing signi cant harm to overall economic activity, and that such phenomena are much more likely to arise with banks or other nancial entities with their highly leveraged capital structures, complex asset holdings, and also liability (deposit) holders behaving in an uncoordinated and/or unsophisticated manner, has provided a signi cant basis for the prevailing frameworks for nancial regulation. Yet, as a recent survey of this literature by Summer (2003) asserts, so far there is far from complete agreement on the de nition of systemic risk, let alone on the relative importance of alternative channels for its propagation across institutions. For example, in a recent collection of articles by some prominent scholars in Kaufman (1995) , these de nitions have ranged from "a sudden, and usually unexpected collapse of con dence in a signi cant portion of the banking or nancial system", to "event that disrupts information in nancial markets", to "putative disruptions in the payments and settlement systems" in which banks are key participants. In his turn, Kaufman adopts the pragmatic de nition of "an event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions and markets comprising a system", which does not evoke or favor any speci c chain of causality for propagation.
Yet, as Summer (2003) notes, in order to provide a set of micro foundations for analysis of potentially welfareimproving nancial regulations, in response to market failures in these systems, any such de nition of systemic risk "has to be combined with a theory of economic behavior and risk taking". For example, "one concern in this context is that banks, due to information, coordination or incentive problems, tend to take risks that could in principle be better diversi ed". Another concerns the degree and contractual pattern of inter-connection among banks via interbank transactions in loans cum deposits or in Derivatives markets. As Kahn and Santos (2005) ask, do banks have incentives to set up an optimal degree of interdependence in liabilities and payments arrangements?
As the theoretical literature dealing with systemic risk -which owes its origins in earlier work on deposit contracting and fragility in optimal risk-sharing arrangements in single or representative banks, such as Bryant (1980) , Diamond and Dybvig(1983) , Chari and Jagannathan (1988) , Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) -has grown in the last decade, a partitioning of the types of evolving models has been discerned by some reviewers of this literature. For example, Summer distinguishes between models which depend on Domino effects, versus those which emphasize Information Effects. In the former, the existence of (usually) pre-committed rights to demandability or transferability of claims among and across banks may lead to the propagation of failures or at least losses to depositors across these, as in the papers of Allen and Gale (2000) , and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), as well as in Dasgupta (2004) . Alternatively, the possibility of "contagion" of failures across banks might arise from their adapting highly correlated portfolio choices ex ante, in response to incentives for survival or future pro ts that are enhanced by the interim successes of other banks, as examined in the recent paper of Acharya and Yorulmazer (2002) . Some other papers have examined channels for contagion that arise from the dissipation of asset values in secondary markets arising from dif culties at a subset of banks. Included among this set are the papers of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in their collateral-constrained credit market, Allen and Gale (2000) in an abstract banking model with a secondary market for long-term assets, and Schnabel and Shin (2004) which pertains to a historical context in which the local aspects of reputation and contract enforcement led to overlapping obligations to investors for multiple intermediaries involved in a "credit chain" (hence aspects of the Domino-type models are also present).
As yet, there has been no compelling analyses advanced regarding the optimality or otherwise of some of the contractual arrangements that have been postulated, and the precise manner in which regulations may improve on their performance in market or strategic interactions among banks, and their debtors cum creditors. For example, Kahn and Santos (2005) have expressed the opinion that if the "zero probability" aggregate shock at a single bank that is responsible for contagious failures at other banks in the Allen and Gale (2000) model is anticipated, then "a solution would be to cut that single bank out of the insurance arrangement" for ef cient management of crosssectional variations in depositors' liquidity demands at banks. In other words, interim lending contracts among banks may cope with such shocks better than ex ante inter-bank deposits, which Allen and Gale recognize but de-emphasize, supposedly owing to the free-riding problem (analyzed in Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) ) vis-à-vis investing in liquid reserves that would create, notwithstanding a similar problem of free-riding given interest-paying inter-bank deposits. A similar observation applies to the model of Dasgupta (2004) , which extends the papers of Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) to analyze the contagion of debtor-bank failures to creditor banks; it is assumed there that the inter-bank loan market for sharing liquidity shocks does not take cognizance of interim shocks to asset returns fundamentals which may lead to a run at the debtor bank. Indeed, Kahn and Santos reach the (tentative) conclusion that, given suf ciently judicious inter-bank contracting, there would be no socially sub-optimal degree of inter-dependence across banks, unless there are (negative) externalities from the failures of multiple banks affecting economic agents who are not involved in any contractual relations with banks. They suggest a non-Walrasian payment system with matching externalities across sellers and buyers (who are also bank depositors) as an example of such a scenario with externalities; see also Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) in which unrestricted transfer rights in interbank payment systems mitigate the impact of such externalities. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2002) , in a model in which bank depositors learn about an aggregate economic state from the proportion of banks which are able to pay their depositors fully at an interim date, also conclude that the equilibrium choices of correlations among banks' portfolios is constrained ef cient.
In this paper, we take the rst steps in building a model which combines features of models in which contagion occurs through direct nancial linkages across banks, with those in which individual banks take risks ex ante that could have been better diversi ed. However, unlike in some of the papers discussed above, our inter-bank credit market operates at an interim date (banks make symmetric choices ex ante) with full cognizance of the realized and expected shocks to the pro tability of individual banks. Nonetheless, if a debtor bank at the interim stage, which became so because of an adverse but not fatal interim investment return shock, again suffers from an adverse shock in the next period, leading to (partial) defaults on the contractual obligations to its depositors and inter-bank lender(s), then that leads to the other creditor bank(s) to also default to its depositors to a greater extent in the nal than in the interim period; we term this Sequential Contagion. Both the degree of interim default, and its possible propagation across banks over time, would have been lower or non-existent had these banks diversi ed among borrowers in their ex ante loan portfolio choices, but that is precluded by a key aspect of the bankers' (otherwise risk-and default-averse) preferences, which we discuss in some detail below.
We assume that bankers' utilities depend not just on the pro t of their own bank after netting out any non-pecuniary (reputational) penalties for defaults as in Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Diamond (1984) , but also on winning in the sense of the extent of their higher pro tability relative to that of the other bank(s). This assumption attempts to capture, in a reduced form fashion, the notion that being a winner enables a bank, or other nancial organization, to attract more funds into their operations, thus enhancing future payoffs to their owner-mangers. Empirical evidence for such a phenomenon can be found, in the context of mutual funds, in Chevalier and Elison (1997) , and its theoretical underpinning lie in such winning performances being "signals" of the underlying capabilities of bankers to nd or monitor better investments. In particular, when equilibrium inferences regarding bank managers' capabilities in this regard are made ex post by a decentralized and anonymous pool of extant and potential investors, rather than from behavior induced by pre-committed ex ante contracting, the resulting impact on bankers' choices of risk and correlation in their portfolio strategies is unlikely to be constrained ef cient, as strongly suggested by the papers of Hvide and Kristiansen (2000) , and Dasgupta and Prat (2006) in which in equilibrium fund managers "churn" their portfolios even when they have no information that is superior to that of other market participants. In the context of banks, perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of such excessively risk-taking (but not correlation-maximizing) portfolio strategies arises in the context of international currency markets, in which banks are dominant participants. It has been estimated that the annual volumes of trade (with necessarily zero-sum returns across banks) in the major currency markets exceed the volume of world trade in real goods and services, which might be hedged, by a factor of hundreds. We develop our model along the lines of Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2004, 2005, 2006a and b), which in turn builds on the papers of Tsomocos (2003a and b), which extends the papers of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) , and Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) to analyze various channels of systemic nancial instability. Deposit contracts in our model involve payments over multiple periods and are not demandable; thus co-ordination failures of the types analyzed in typical banking models play no role in our analysis. Our model is also built in a single-commodity real economy without any role for at money, although we hope to incorporate such a store of value in future work. In what follows, we detail the speci cs of our model, which is an extended example for which we compute equilibria with and without contagion in alternative scenarios. In future research, we will consider the issues relating to optimal regulatory interventions in our setting, along the lines pursued in Acharya (2000) and Goodhart et al. (2004 Goodhart et al. ( , 2005 Goodhart et al. ( , 2006a and b).
The Model
The model has four households, h 2 H = fα; β ; φ ; ψg; and two banks, b 2 B = fγ; δ g, where time horizon extends over three time periods (t 2 f0; 1; 2g) and after each period there exist two possible states of nature. Thus, the state space consists of s 2 S = f1; :::; 6g. Figure 1 summarizes the state space of the model.
Figure 1: p denotes the probability that state 1 will occur.
We consider an economy without money and a single commodity. Mr. α and β have a small endowment at t = 0, and relatively more at t = 1 and 2. Thus, they borrow real commodities from banks to smooth their consumption path over time. In contrast, Mr. φ and ψ are relatively rich at t = 0, but comparatively poor at t = 1 and 2: They, therefore, function as depositors in this economy. 1 Banks borrow via the deposit market and invest in the loan market. Both markets open only once at t = 0. Both deposit and loan contracts last for two periods, where interest payments are made both at t = 1 and 2. Table I makes the loan/deposit payment stream explicit.
Loan contract Borrower
Deposit Contract Borrower
where, In order to study interbank contagion, we assume that the interbank market opens at t = 1 where banks are given an opportunity to borrow from/lend to each other. In this way, the interbank market serves as the key mechanism in propagating sequential contagion. We further assume that interbank loans borrowed at t = 1 are sought and held to provide a hedge against a recurrence of a bad state at t = 2.
Endogenous default is possible in all three markets and there exists a (non-pecuniary) cost of defaulting in these markets. Moreover, we assume for simplicity that repayment rates in the deposit and interbank markets are the same, i.e. banks are restricted to repay all their creditors similarly.
We introduce a relative performance concept in banks' objective functions. In other words, banks in this model have a preference to outperform their competitors. In this way, even though banks are ex ante allowed to lend to either Mr. α or β (i.e. no limited participation assumption), they will ex post choose to specialize their lending activities in equilibrium. Since agents have different repayment rates for their loan obligations, loans can be thought of as different assets in which banks invest.
The Agents' Optimization Problem and Market Clearing Conditions

The Borrowers' (Household α and β ) Optimization Problem
Each borrower h 2 fα; β g maximizes his payoff which is his utility of consumption minus the default penalty he incurs if he does not pay back his loans Unlike Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2005 and 2006a) and Tsomocos (2003a and b), we do not introduce cash-in-advance constraints since at this stage there is no role for at money in the model.
(i.e. consumption borrowed money from the consumer loan market)
(i.e. consumption + loans repayments commodity endowment in state s 2 f1; 2g at t = 1) 
The Depositors' (Household φ and ψ) Optimization Problem
The optimization problem of depositor h 2 fφ ; ψg is described as follows:
(i.e. bank deposits with banks γ and δ commodity endowment)
(i.e. consumption deposits and interest payment receipt + commodity endowment in state s 2 f1; 2g at t = 1) 
Bank γ's Optimization Problem
Bank γ (similarly bank δ ) maximizes its pro ts in each state and suffers a linear non-pecuniary default penalty if it fails to pay back its loans from the deposit and interbank markets. Its payoff is increased proportionally when it outperforms the other bank with respect to pro ts.
We choose to focus on an equilibrium in which bank γ is a net lender whereas bank δ is a net borrower in the
(i.e. credit extension deposit demand)
(i.e. deposit repayment loan repayment in state s = 1 at t = 1 )
(i.e. deposit repayment loan repayment in state s = 2 at t = 1 )
(i.e. interbank deposits bank γ's pro t in s = 1 at t = 1 )
(i.e. deposit repayment loan repayment + interbank deposit repayment in state s 2 f3; 4gat t = 2 )
(i.e. deposit repayment + interbank loan repayment loan repayment in state s 2 f5; 6g at t = 2 ) where, 
(i.e. interbank deposits bank δ 's pro t in s = 2 at t = 1 )
(i.e. deposit repayment + interbank loan repayment loan repayment in state s 2 f3; 4g at t = 2)
(i.e. deposit repayment loan repayment + interbank deposit repayment in state s 2 f5; 6g at t = 2 )
Market Clearing Conditions
There are six markets in the model (two interbank, two consumer loan and two deposit markets). Each of these markets determines a price that equilibrates demand and supply in equilibrium. 2 1 + ρ 1 = µ δ 
Equilibrium
: (4) (6) holdg for h 0 2 fφ ; ψg; B γ (η) = fσ γ : (7) (12) holdg; B δ (η) = fσ δ : (13) (18) holdg: We say that (σ α ; σ β ; σ φ ; σ γ ; σ δ ; p 0 ; p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; ρ; r γ ; r δ ; θ ) is an equilibrium with commercial banks and default iff:
Note that since we do not focus on oligopolistic effects we employ the`continuum' hypothesis and thus agents' actions do not affect equilibrium variables.
Exogenous Parameters and Initial Equilibrium
The value of the exogenous parameters/variables and the resulting initial equilibrium positions are summarized in detail in tables II and III, respectively. The value of endowment of Mr. α and β are chosen so that: (i) they are relatively poorer at t = 0 than at t = 1; 2 and (ii) at t = 1; 2, Mr. α is relatively richer (poorer) than Mr. β in states 1,3, and 5 (states 2,4, and 6). Given (i) and (ii), Mr. α and β become borrowers in the consumer loan market at t = 0 and that the loan repayment rates of Mr. α are higher (lower) than those of Mr. β in states 1,3, and 5 (states 2,4, and 6). We then focus on the equilibrium in which bank γ's pro tability is higher than that of bank δ in the odd states, namely states 1,3, and 5. Given the existence of the relative performance criterion, bank γ has a preference to outperform bank δ in these particular odd states and will, in equilibrium, choose to specialize its lending only to Mr. α whose repayment rates are higher in these states. The same argument holds for Mr. β and bank δ in the even states. Thus, in the equilibrium that we have chosen, the odd states can be thought of as the`good' states for bank γ and the`bad' states for bank δ , and vice versa for the even states. At t = 1, interbank market opens. Banks choose to borrow from this market in an attempt to hedge themselves against the possibility of the recurrence of another bad state (state 3 for bank γ and state 6 for bank δ ). Thus, at t = 1, in the event that state 1 occurs, bank δ which encounters a`bad' state will be a net borrower, whereas bank γ which encounters a good state will be a net lender in the interbank market. In contrast, if state 2 occurs, the net position of the two banks in the interbank market swaps. 
:92 The value of the endowments of Mr. φ and ψ are chosen so that Mr. φ is relatively rich in the odd states and poor in the even states, while Mr. ψ is relatively rich in the even states and poor in the odd states. Thus, Mr. φ who cares more about his expected deposit income in the even states (since he is relatively poor) will rationally choose to deposit the majority of his endowment with bank γ: The same argument holds for Mr. ψ and bank δ :
In states 1 and 2 where no settlement in the interbank market is taking place, the pattern of equilibrium values of repayment rates in the deposit market follow those in the loan market. In other words, banks pay more to their depositors when their debtors encounter`good' states. Thus, as can be seen from table III, bank γ's repayment rate to its depositors is 0.98 if his good state (state 1) occurs whereas the rate falls to 0.77 if his bad state (state 2) occurs. The same argument is true for bank δ 's pattern of repayment rates. However, this is not the case for states 3-6 where settlement in the interbank market also takes place. To illustrate, state 6 is a good state for bank δ since it receives a relatively high repayment rate from Mr. β , i.e. Mr. β 's repayment rate in this state is 0.96 compared with 0.74 if state 5 occurs. Nevertheless, because it receives a relatively low repayment rate in the interbank market from bank γ which encounters a bad state, bank δ therefore ends up defaulting to its depositors more compared to state 2 where there is no interbank market settlement, i.e. bank δ 's repayment rate in state 6 is only 0.87 whereas the rate is 0.98 if a similarly good state occurs in state 2. The upshot of the argument is that even though banks have specialized in their asset investments, recurrence of negative shocks to a single bank are sequentially contagious affecting adversely the sound banks through the interbank market.
Comparative Statics
Now we consider the effects of changes in the exogenous variables of the model. We have chosen to elaborate on three comparative statics which we believe can best illuminate channels of contagion via the interbank market and the importance of the relative performance criterion exhibited by the model.
An increase in the relative performance coef cient
When ϖ = 0, banks would no longer specialize in their lending. They will lend to both Mr. α and Mr. β , thus forming a diversi ed loan portfolio. In this case, contagion does not occur only through the interbank market. For example, if Mr. α defaults then it will affect both banks γ and δ who have lent to him. So, even if we`close' the interbank market, contagion (not sequential) will happen through the consumer loan markets period by period. 3 At some threshold value of ϖ ; both banks will polarize their lending behavior. Now, even though banks specialize, contagion occurs only through the interbank market. Note that this threshold value of ϖ corresponds to a`corner' solution with respect to the lending behavior of the banks. Put differently, further increases of ϖ still maintain banks' lending specialization.
Our initial equilibrium is one such`corner' solution whereby bank gamma lends to Mr. α and bank δ lends to Mr. β . An increase in ϖ causes the two banks to repay less to their creditors in their respective 'good' states. In particular, bank γ repays less in the odd states whereas bank δ in the even states. This happens because as ϖ increases, banks want to outperform their competitor even more in their`good' states since the marginal bene t (i.e. ϖ) of outperforming increases. Bank γ repays less to its creditors in state 5; this causes a negative contagion effect to bank δ who lends to bank γ in state 2 in the interbank market (this result is symmetric to the other interbank market in state 1). However, bank δ 's total repayment from bank γ is ambiguous. On the one hand, the repayment rates decrease but on the other hand the interbank interest rate increases. So, total repayment depends on the relative size of these two effects. In our parameterization, it turns out that total repayment increases. Table IV U table IV where all welfare changes are tabulated), as we increase ϖ; both depositors are hurt since the deposit rates decrease. Also, both banks, in order to outperform the other, decrease their repayment rates in their respective good states, further decreasing the depositors' welfare. Mr. α's welfare slightly increases because of lower lending rates whereas Mr. β 's welfare remains unaffected because lending rates do not change signi cantly, he thus adjusts his repayment to maintain his utility. However, the relative performance effect is uniform across both banks. We have calculated both ex ante payoff and ex post payoff (i.e. ex ante payoff plus relative performance bene t). Because of the relative performance bene t, both banks reduce their repayment rates in their respective good states signi cantly and also overlend in order to maximize the difference in pro ts with their competitor. Thus, their ex ante payoff is reduced since they now incur much higher default penalties. In sum, we observe the negative extenalities that relative performance considerations generate to both banks as well as to depositors.
An increase in endowment of Mr. α in state 6
Given higher endowment of Mr. α in state 6, he repays more on his consumer loans in this particular state (" v α 6 ). This in turn increases bank γ's expected pro t from lending: It then supplies more credit, pushing the lending rate down. Although the cost of borrowing is lower, Mr. α borrows less in equilibrium since the income effect dominates the substitution effect. In order to nance its higher credit extension, bank γ also demands more deposits. This causes its deposit rate (r γ d ) to rise. A higher r γ d implies that either Mr. φ or ψ would supply more deposits with bank γ: For the speci c set of exogenous parameters that we consider, Mr. φ deposits more with bank γ and less so with bank δ , pushing up bank δ 's deposit rate (r δ d ). Given a higher deposit rate offered by bank δ , Mr. ψ then switches part of his deposits from bank γ to bank δ : Given less net supply of deposits, bank δ decreases its credit extension, pushing up its lending rate r β . Because the income effect dominates the substitution effect, Mr. β borrows more from bank δ .
Given a linear default penalty cost structure, the marginal bene t from repaying in any state s increases linearly with respect to the amount of loan demand. However, because the agents' utility functions are quadratic, the marginal cost from repaying in any state s is increasing with respect to the amount of loan demand. 4 Because Mr. α demands less loans, he repays more in all states, especially in state 6 which there is an additional direct effect from higher endowment. Since bank γ's expected income from lending in state 6 increases owing to a higher repayment rate v α 6 , it repays more to its creditors in this particular state, (" v γ 6 ). In contrast, since Mr. β demands more credit, following the same line of argument, he repays less to his creditor in all states.
Bank γ borrows from the interbank market in order to smoothen its expected income between states 5 and 6, i.e. it gets an additional income if the bad state (state 6) occurs at the expense of having to pay a premium if the good state occurs. Thus, given higher expected income in the bad state (" v α 6 ), the incentive to hedge against the bad state declines. Bank γ then demands fewer interbank loans, pushing down the interbank rate in state 2. In contrast, bank δ demands more from the interbank market in state 1 in anticipation of lower expected income if there is a recurrence of another bad state, i.e. state 3 occurs. Thus, the interbank rate in state 1 increases.
As mentioned, bank γ repays more to its creditors in state 6. Thus, bank δ which supplies interbank loans to bank γ expects higher income from its interbank market investment in this particular state: Even though bank δ suffers from lower repayment rates from Mr. β in the consumer loan market, this effect is dominated by the positive contagion effect via the interbank market. Thus, bank δ repays more to its depositors in this particular state. This shows that, even though each bank specializes in its lending activities owing to its relative performance preference, a shock arising from one particular bank can produce a contagion effect to the others via their interaction in the interbank market. This result shows that contagion can occur not only when banks are well-diversi ed and their asset investment returns are correlated as commonly argued, but it can also arise when banks specialize in their asset investment and their returns are not correlated.
As far as the welfare issue is concerned, Mr. α is better off since he now has more endowments, as well as bene ts from lower lending rate. However, Mr. β is negatively affected since his borrowing cost rises due to the fact that his bank (δ ) cuts its credit supply. Both Mr. φ and ψ are better off since the deposit rates offered by both banks increase. Bank γ's pro tability naturally improves since its client, Mr. α, repays more. The interesting point is that, although bank δ suffers from the fact that his client, Mr. β , defaults more, the aforementioned`positive contagion effect' via the interbank market is suf ciently large to outweigh the negative effect. Thus, bank δ 's pro tability also increases as well. This result signi es the importance of`contagion effect via the interbank market'.
3.3 An increase in endowment of Mr. α in state 1 Given higher endowment of Mr. α in state 1, he repays more on his consumer loans in this particular state. This in turn increases bank γ's expected pro t from lending: The effect then feeds through to the loan and deposit markets in the same manner as described in the previous comparative statics. However, the key important difference lies in the changes in the equilibrium values of households' and banks' repayment rates. As explained in the previous exercise, since Mr. α demands less credit, he ends up repaying more to bank γ. However, as contrasted to the previous case where Mr. α repays signi cantly a lot in state 6, here the additional direct effect from higher endowment operates to magnify Mr. α's in state 1. Because bank γ now faces higher deposit rate and lower lending rate and that the repayment rates of Mr. α in states 5 and 6 do not increase very much, bank γ repays its creditors less in these particular states. Anticipating this, bank γ borrows more from the interbank market at t = 1 in order to mitigate this negative effect, pushing up the interbank rate in state 2
Because bank γ repays its creditors less in states 5 and 6, this produces a`negative' contagion effect to bank δ who is the creditor of bank γ in the interbank market. However, since bank δ also bene ts from a higher lending rate, the directional change of bank δ 's net income from its interbank market deposits is ambiguous.
The important point from this comparative statics is that the model exhibits`sequential contagion' via an interbank market channel. Speci cally, a shock which is speci c to bank γ's borrowers at t = 1 can produce a contagion effect to bank δ at t = 2 via their interaction in the interbank market. However, the exact directional change depends on the assumptions and speci c parameter structure of the model.
In sum, sequential contagion occurs not because of the structure of bank portfolios, but because of interbank market lending that creates a channel connecting and disseminating shocks to the entire banking sector.
Concluding Remarks
Given our symmetric setup in the interbank market, i.e. the position of the two banks swaps at t = 1 depending on which state of nature actually realizes, it is natural to expect symmetric results when we conduct comparative statics analysis. This is actually what we observe. For example, we found that an increase in endowment of Mr. α in state 6 (a good state for Mr. β ; and therefore for bank δ , at t = 2) gives a symmetric directional effect compared with an increase in endowment of Mr. β in state 3 (a good state for Mr. α, and therefore for bank γ, at t = 2). Similarly, an increase in the default penalty for bank γ in state 6 gives a symmetric directional effect compared with an increase in the default penalty for bank δ in state 3.
The important point from this model is that sequential contagion is caused via the interbank market channel even when banks specialize in their portfolio composition and their returns are uncorrelated. Finally, whenever banks incorporate a relative performance criterion in their maximization problem then limited participation (i.e. specialization of bank lending to speci c consumer classes) emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon within the model. Therefore, this model arguably provides microfoundations to the limited participation assumption of Tsomocos (2004, 2005 , 2006 a and b) .
